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ABSTRACT
The United States Navy is facing a need for a novel surface
combatant capability. This new system of ships must be deigned
to meet the uncertainty associated with constantly changing
required mission capabilities, threats, and technological
advances. Flexibility in design and management will enable these
systems to maximize their performance under changing conditions.
Real options involve the 'right but not the obligation' to take
a course of action. Real options embody the flexibility that
allows projects to be continually reshaped, as uncertainty
becomes resolved. This thesis seeks to identify and analyze the
real options available for the design and acquisition of naval
ships. This thesis also seeks to determine the value of these
options and determine the best types and amount of flexibility
to design into naval systems in order to maximize the value of
the system over time under uncertain conditions.
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Title: Senior Lecturer, Engineering Systems Division
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CHAPTER 1 Introduction
1.1 Motivation
The United States Navy is facing a need for new systems of ships
which are designed to meet uncertainty associated with required
mission capabilities, threats, technology advances, performance
predictions, and design synthesis, among others. Since the end
of the Cold War, the types of capabilities required of naval
ships, the environments in which they operate, and the threats
faced by them continue to evolve and change rapidly.
Previously, with the Soviet Union as the principal opposition
force, ships could be designed to carry out specified missions
against a known adversary. With the collapse of the Soviet
Union, programs such as the Seawolf class submarine have been
cancelled. The Seawolf was designed as a blue-water submarine
to combat the Soviet submarine fleet. As that mission
disappeared, the nearly four billion dollar cost of a Seawolf
was no longer justified. Lately the DD-21 destroyer program was
cancelled due to a shift in mission requirements.
The US Secretary of Defense has summarized the need for
considering uncertainty in the early stages of the ship design
process (Rumsfeld 2001):
* During the past 60 years, the US has spent an average of 8%
of GDP on defense. Investing in defense during peacetime
acts as an insurance policy for the future by decreasing
the risk of conflicts for future generations.
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* Although the US still fields the world's best fighting
force, its legacy systems, designed to win the Cold War,
may not be able to meet future requirements.
* The Quadrennial Defense Review must focus on
transformation, which will provide a hedge against future
uncertainty while continuing to meet current needs.
* Forces must be transformed to rapidly adapt to emerging
threats.
" A balance must be struck between forces, resources, and
modernization, while accounting for future risk.
Transformed forces will be able to defeat more capable
adversaries at an affordable cost, while remaining flexible
enough to meet uncertain future requirements.
* Combining threat based and capabilities based performance
standards will provide a hedge against future uncertainty
risk.
" Capabilities based performance standards mitigate risks and
hedge against uncertainty in the future. (Though future
threats cannot be described with certainty, future
capabilities can be determined).
" In an ever-changing environment, a wider range of
contingencies and options for employing forces must be
considered.
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* Dealing with uncertainty must be a focus of US defense
planning.
* The DoD must select, develop, sustain a portfolio of
capabilities to meet current and future challenges.
* Capabilities and concepts must meet the uncertain
challenges of the future.
* A balance must be struck to meet the current challenges
while transforming force to meet evolving, uncertain
challenges in future.
" Although it cannot be known for certain who the future
enemy will be, shifting from a threat to a capabilities
based approach, will allow designers to anticipate
capabilities that will build up vulnerabilities and enhance
capabilities.
" Give greater priority to experimentation and show more
tolerance for failure during testing and development of
advanced systems.
" Develop more rapidly responsive, scalable, modular units
capable of autonomous and integrated operations.
" Reform acquisition, financial, and business practices.
" Uncertainty supports experimentation which creates options
and allows learning to make adjustments over time.
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" Develop a roadmap for transforming near and far term
objectives.
" Identify program options and evaluate based on cost and
effect measure of merit.
" Evaluate options against criteria for strategy and
preferred characteristics in terms of reference.
" Develop alternative investment profiles across capability
areas.
" Identify programs or capabilities for retirement,
divestment, and truncation.
In addition, the Navy Strategic Planning Guidance provides
further evidence that explicit consideration of uncertainty in
future warfare needs would be beneficial (U.S. Chief of Naval
Operations 2000):
* The Navy needs to implement a strategy-based approach to
the planning, programming, and budgeting process to ensure
the Navy that can provide broad access and influence ashore
in 2 1 st Century Information Age.
" The Navy can guide the transformation by describing
organizing principles, operational concepts, and priorities
for future naval forces to exploit new opportunities and
capabilities to ensure access forward.
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" In order to meet future requirements, the Navy must take
full advantage of emerging technologies and concepts in
order to equip sailors with increasingly capable ships and
equipment ready to respond anytime and anywhere.
" Intelligence assessments form the basis for identifying
areas where risks can be taken and where we need to hedge
against an uncertain future.
" Although the future in a security environment cannot be
predicted with certainty, trends point to focus on
littorals and in-land.
" Regional and non-state actors and increased globalization
of economies points toward a more complex security
environment which along with other forces adds uncertainty
to the planning process.
" The future Navy requires the capability to dominate over
wide spectrum of environments, from dissuading global
ambitions of future regional powers to low intensity
conflicts and strategic deterrence.
" The spectrum of challenges faced by the Navy will be broad:
from information attack to pirates in small fast boats to
fully modernized regional combat fleets of surface ships,
submarines and aircraft.
* The capabilities required will vary from region to region
and in virtually every theatre of operations.
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" The capabilities required will be across a spectrum of
operations from peacetime presence to combat missions.
" Trends in design towards modular construction will allow
for customer specific variations in designs without
significant added cost while providing significant
additional capability.
" The expanding global market and increasing technology make
advanced designs available to many foreign actors.
" Future US Naval forces can be expected to be involved in
many missions at the low end of the violence continuum.
These forces must be ready to support MIO, humanitarian
support, terrorist reaction, and peace-support missions.
These missions are more likely than regional or local wars.
Supporting these missions requires interest in emerging
non-lethal force capabilities.
* The Navy must continue its over 200 year old mission of
promoting peace and defeating adversaries when necessary.
* A focus on required capabilities for the near, mid and far
terms must be considered, rather than the traditional focus
on platforms and systems. Programs must be continuously
refined to reflect present and projected capabilities.
* Factors such as operational risk, and effectiveness
(benefits) of alternatives, in addition to cost, must be
considered when examining desired capabilities, current
capabilities, and resources.
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Finally, several recent GAO reports cite the need for the
Department of Defense to recognize uncertainty and plan for it
during the acquisition process (U.S. GAO 1999, 1997a):
" DOD seeks to make its current organization and business
practices more agile and responsive. DOD also hopes that
this initiative will provide a major source of savings that
can be used to help fund DOD's planned $20 billion annual
increase in weapon systems modernization.
* DOD desires to reengineer the Defense business and support
operations by adopting and applying revolutionary new
business and management practices learned from the private
sector.
" DOD managers have had few incentives to improve DOD's
financial, acquisition, and infrastructure management
approaches. In the DOD culture, the success of a manager's
career depends more often on moving programs and operations
through the DOD process rather than on improving the
process itself.
" DOD strategic goals and objectives have not been linked to
those of the military services and Defense agencies, and
19
DOD's guidance has tended to lack specificity. Without
clear, hierarchically-linked goals and performance
measures, DOD managers have not been able to show how their
work contributes to the attainment of DOD's strategic
goals.
* Developing strategic and tactical plans provide a roadmap
to guide reform and track progress throughout the
organization.
* Establishing objective, outcome-oriented performance
measures that link to strategic and tactical plans,
establish accountability, and provides information for
making mid-course corrections.
* Planning is a dynamic process, and the ongoing and planned
activities, along with any additional input from OMB,
congressional staff, and other stakeholders, could result
in changes to DOD plan.
* The DOD plans should discuss more clearly how external
factors link to and could affect achieving its goals.
Framing the acquisition problem in this manner would allow
the identification of resources needed to implement its
20
plans, and any external factors that could impede
resolution.
* Office of Management and Budget (OMB) Circular A-11 points
out that agencies' achievement of their goals and
objectives can be influenced by certain external factors
that exist, occur, or change over the time period covered
by their plans. The circular notes that these factors can
be economic, demographic, social, or environmental in
nature. It states that the strategic plan should describe
each external factor, indicate its link with a particular
goal(s) and describe how achieving the goal could be
affected by the factor.
1.2 Background
Historically ships rarely fulfill only the missions for which
they were initially designed since mission requirements often
change due to their long time to be put in service and their
expected long service life. For example, some CVNs, with
addition of equipment and upgrades, have used their lifetime
weight margin and have required extensive hull form changes,
which resulted in unsatisfactory ship motions adversely
impacting aircraft operation (USS Midway). Flexibility is the
key to producing a ship that will be able to evolve with
21
changing requirements and provide the most utility over the
course of many years service.
Upfront systems engineering is used to match mission
requirements with resources. Even in this basis case, there is
an option to start or not start the program, based on whether
the requirements have changed and/or the mission still exists.
The key is to maintain flexibility in the requirements, since it
should be expected that they will change over the long
acquisition and service life of the warship. Unlike engineering
thinking, the goal is not to optimize the design, as
optimization infers certainty, but rather to design flexibility
that can be invoked, if required to hedge against uncertain
changes in order to maintain the ship as a viable fleet asset.
To optimize for one scenario is to potentially sub-optimize when
requirements change. The value of this flexibility cannot be
determined from a strictly engineering point of view, but rather
the exogenous, or market uncertainties concerning changing
mission requirements and threats must be accounted for.
Properly valuing flexibility is especially important now with
tight budgets and a smaller number of ships, each ship must be
flexible enough to continue to be of war fighting value as
threats and missions change. Real options may provide a method
for properly determining the value of a fleet of small flexible
ships that can switch between many missions and a few larger
multi-mission ships.
In order to maximize effectiveness for the war fighter and
return on investment for the taxpayer, flexibility should be
explicitly considered in naval ship design. Ships are designed
to meet multiple mission needs that have been identified and
validated by future war fighting projections. These ships are
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matched to budget and mission projections 10 to 15 years out
from the concept design exploration. Ship designers seek to
optimize the ship performance to the stated mission requirements
while simultaneously minimizing cost of ships through optimizing
ship attributes, such as size, installed power, etc., or
minimizing life cost attributes, such as fuel use rate or
manpower levels, while at the same time maximizing war fighting
effectiveness. The challenge is in maintaining the context for
the ship system cost and war fighting effectiveness over the
long design and acquisition period, when the assumed usage
scenario projection usually changes.
Flexibility in the way of providing extra or new capabilities,
not specifically identified in the current requirements, is
currently accounted for using weight and stability margins.
These margins account for some general uncertainty in the design
and construction of the ship as well as allowing for some
lifetime growth. Adding flexibility to the ship during the
design phase to account for mission and other exogenous
uncertainty seems to be an obvious solution, but this leads to
such possible penalties as carrying weight around as ballast
margin to be used for future addition to capability (which
wastes weight and impacts fuel cost) or the addition of modular
structures which take away from precious payload carrying
capability. Defining a way to value how much and what types of
flexibility should be added and at what cost is required to
allow informed trade off of effectiveness and cost of
considering the uncertainty involved.
As with most engineering projects, risk during the project is to
be avoided and uncertainty is looked upon as detrimental. Risk
management plans are reactive and look to keep the project on a
23
pre-determined path. A dynamic strategic plan that is flexible
to adapt to changes in mission requirements and capabilities, as
well as technical uncertainties, should add value to the
project; improving return on investment and improving mission
effectiveness. Real options are a way of looking at complex
projects that involve uncertainty. Real options thinking is
proactive towards risk and uncertainty and actually becomes more
valuable when uncertainty is high.
1.3 Real Options
Real options provide a dynamic strategic plan that incorporates
and values flexibility. Real options match the way decisions
are already made, by waiting for uncertainty to be resolved, and
showing the value based on possible future outcomes.
The concepts of options thinking, and real options, are based on
financial options and methods. A historical view of the
application of real options puts these concepts into
perspective. The initial application of real options was used
to solve the discount rate problem present in traditional Net
Present Value (NPV) and decision analysis (DA) methods. The
Black-Scholes formula was used once an underlying asset that
mimicked the market uncertainty was identified. These examples
were applied to private sector projects. Others (Gonzalez-
Zugusti, etc al 1999, Lamassoure 2001, Ford and Ceylan 2001a,
Ford and Ceylan 2001b, Ford and Ceylan 2001c, McVey 2002,
Shishko and Ebbeler 1999, Ramirez 2002) extended the application
to public sector projects, but the methods still focused on cost
savings and primarily dealt with the product uncertainties.
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In order to apply Real Options to naval ship design and
acquisition, the real options method must be extended to the
public sector. Key differences that must be overcome for this
application are that the war fighting capability, mission need,
and budgetary uncertainty do not deal with a real market, but
rather uncertainties exogenous to the project. Additionally,
these major uncertainties deal mostly with non-monetary benefits
from the project.
In order to constrain the method to be viable in the Navy
context, the current practices within the context of current DOD
5000.2 (series) acquisition instructions are referenced. Any
extensions to DOD 5000.2 (series) aim to add more flexibility to
designs and identify program management options. The thesis
seeks to properly value the management of the project and
consider flexible physical options that allow faster switching
between mission capabilities without the need for extensive ship
overhaul. The method will use decision analysis to value these
options to determine how much flexibility to add and how to
choose among a portfolio of competing designs under uncertainty.
The use of real options thinking should enhance current methods
used to make ship design trade-off decisions, which do not
account for uncertainty.
1.4 Thesis Outline
This thesis seeks to examine how real options methods can be
extended to be useful in a naval ship design and acquisition
setting since the most important values derived from the process
are non-monetary and very difficult to place a monetary value
on.
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The thesis divided into 6 chapters including this introduction.
Chapter 2 gives an overview of the defense acquisition system
including both historical and recent reform changes. Areas in
both acquisition and design that could benefit from the
application of real options thinking and methods are identified.
Chapter 3 begins by defining and discussing flexibility.
Chapter 3 then provides background for real options from their
birth in valuing options on traded securities to current project
valuation in public and private settings. Chapter 3 also
discusses different methods that can be used to value real
options and argues which methods may be appropriate in the case
of naval ship design and acquisition.
Chapter 4 draws on the material presented in chapters 2 and 3 to
present a practical method for implementing real options
techniques into naval ship design and acquisition. The method
attempts to identify how flexibility can be incorporated into
both design and acquisition and how the types and amounts of
flexibility can be valued in order to determine whether the
value added by the flexibility is justified.
Chapter 5 applies the method presented in chapter 4 to a
representative case study based on current navy design trends
and requirements.
Chapter 6 provides an overall summary.
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Defense Acquisition and Ship Design
Real options have their roots in the financial realm and as such
have thus far been applied to the valuation of private firm
projects whose goal is to maximize profits for the firm's
shareholders. In order to see how real options might be applied
to the valuation of a public sector project, specifically the
acquisition of naval warships, the characteristics of the DOD
acquisition process are examined. The context for the
uncertainty in the projection of war fighting needs, which
drives the need for options thinking, is included.
2.1 DOD Acquisition Overview
The government program manager is the agent for the war fighter
who ensures requirements are met effectively, efficiently and in
the shortest possible time. While the driving force behind
private firm projects is to increase profits, the purpose of the
DOD acquisition system is characterized as:
The DOD acquisition system exists to secure and sustain the
nation's investment in technologies, programs, and product
support necessary to achieve the National Security Strategy
and support the United States Armed Forces. The
Department's investment strategy must be postured to
support not only today's force, but also the next force,
and future forces beyond that. The primary objective of
Defense acquisition is to acquire quality products that
satisfy user needs with measurable improvements to mission
accomplishment and operational support, in a timely manner,
27
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and at a fair and reasonable price. (U.S. Department of
Defense 2000)
A DOD acquisition program is a comprehensive, cradle-to-grave
process that includes design, engineering, test and evaluation
and operational support of Defense systems. A successful
acquisition program is characterized as one that provides a
capable and supportable system to the war fighter when and where
it is needed and does so affordably. Defense acquisition deals
with very long time frames in supporting not only today's force,
but also the next force, and the force after next. Its goal is
to provide a quality product that creates a measurable
improvement in mission accomplishment and operational support,
in a timely manner, at a fair price (U.S. Department of Defense
2000).
Defense acquisition projects constitute some of the most costly
and complex undertakings and represents one of the largest
management challenges within the federal government. Even with
reduced budget trends, the Defense operations involve over $1
trillion in assets and a budgetary authority of about $250-$310
billion annually. This annual amount accounts for approximately
15 percent of the Federal budget and is estimated at about 3.2
percent of the U.S. gross domestic product (U.S. Department of
Defense 2000).
Most Defense systems are large and extremely complex and none
more so than naval warships. The design and production of "a
major combatant warship is one of the most complex undertakings
of man. It is as complicated as sending a man to the moon."
(Maurelli 1997) These large, complex projects are based on a
validated mission needs and are also subject to uncertainties in
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threats, mission requirements, budgets, and technology, as well
as, numerous external factors such as: policies, public opinion,
emergencies, and ever present and changing threats to national
security.
2.2 Defense Acquisition Reform
With the fall of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War,
many feel that a "revolution in military affairs" in under way,
driven by rapid advanced in technology, evolving threats, and
shrinking defense budgets. In order to keep pace with these
revolutionary changes in the conduct of warfare, the DOD has
embarked on a series of reform measures intended to
fundamentally change it's business practices and reengineer its
infrastructure to better support the evolving needs of the war
fighter. This "revolution in business affairs" aims to
accomplish three things: (1) expand and fully implement
acquisition reform; (2) work to do away with specialized
government auditing and accounting procedures in order to
attract more private firms to do business with the DOD; and (3)
reduce the size and cost of the Defense infrastructure by
applying commercial practices (U.S. Department of Defense 2000).
With reduced budgets, programs were forced to prioritize and
with fewer new programs being started, the DOD realized that it
would not be able to continue with business as usual.
Fundamental changes were required in order to provide the
required capabilities faster, better, and cheaper. A new
outlook for acquisition was established focusing on mature
technology, interoperable systems, and a stronger industrial
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base with more civilian and military integration (U.S.
Department of Defense 2000).
DOD's vision for Acquisition Reform is:
DOD will be recognized as the world's smartest, most
efficient and most responsive buyer of best-value goods and
services that meet the war fighters' need from a globally
competitive national industrial base (U.S. Department of
Defense 2000).
To realize the vision of Acquisition Reform, DOD has taken on
the following missions (U.S. Department of Defense 2000):
" Adapting the best practices of world-class customers
and suppliers;
" Continually improving the acquisition process to
ensure that it remains flexible, agile, and to the
maximum extent possible, based on best practices;
* Provide incentives for acquisition personnel to
innovate and manage risk, rather than avoid it, and;
" Taking maximum advantage of emerging technologies that
enables business process reengineering and enterprise
integration.
" Recognizing opportunities for the war fighter to try
out new technologies
Acquisition reform also extends to the way that the DOD awards
contracts. No longer will the Department buy from the lowest
cost supplier who provided the minimum requirements, but rather
contracts will be awarded based on overall value. This overall
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value is assessed by a trade-off of cost and non-cost factors
such as performance, quality, and schedule. Additionally, the
war fighter must determine cost objectives that will allow an
affordability determination when compared to other needs and
their costs (U.S. Department of Defense 2000).
2.3 The Reformed DOD Acquisition Program
Defense acquisition programs begin with a warfare need, an
enabling technology, or a combination of both. The acquisition
program is comprised on three different systems: the
Requirements Generation System, the Defense Acquisition System,
and the Planning, Programming, and Budgeting system. The
Requirements Generation system identifies the mission needs,
deficiencies, or technological opportunities for the program.
The Defense Acquisition System combines the need and
technologies into reliable, affordable, and sustainable systems.
The Planning, Programming, and Budgeting system provided the
funding required for carrying out the program.
The acquisition system is comprised of time periods called
phases separated by decision points called milestones (Figure 2-
1). Under the reformed acquisition process, the milestones are
A, B, and C, although each program is unique and may not contain
all phases. Milestones allow for program reviews with the
opportunity for mid-course corrections.
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Milestone decision authorities use exit criteria to establish
goals for an acquisition program during a particular phase.
Exit criteria are phase specific tasks selected to track
progress in important technical, schedule or risk management
areas. They act as "gates," which when successfully passed,
demonstrate that the program in on track to meet achieve its
final goals.
Milestone A
Milestone A is referred to as pre-systems acquisition. This
phase defines user needs and develops technology solutions to
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validated mission needs. The key concepts in pre-system
acquisition are:
" Keep all reasonable options open to allow for cost,
schedule, and performance trade-offs
* Avoid early commitment to a specific design solution so as
to block insertion of new technology
" Define requirements in broad operational terms
* Plan time-phased requirements for performance parameters
Following these key concepts, an Analysis of Alternatives (AOA)
is conducted in order to determine the cost and mission
effectiveness of alternative design solutions. The AOA is an
independent scientific study meant to aid the decision maker by
showing the relative advantages and disadvantages of
alternatives considered, as well as their sensitivity to changes
in key performance parameters or and assumptions. The AOA
should seek to determine whether the military value of a
solution is worth the cost, without pre-determining any specific
solution.
The results of the AOA allow the Operational Requirements
Document (ORD) to be initiated. The ORD lists required
operational objectives and goals and threshold values for key
performance parameters (KPPs).
Following a successful Milestone A, the program enters the
Concept and Technology Development Phase (CTD). There are two
work efforts within CTD: Concept Exploration (CE) and Component
Advanced Development (CAD). Concept Exploration deals with the
evaluation of multiple concepts that consists of competitive,
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parallel, short-term concept studies by private industry.
Concept Advanced Development is entered when the concept is
clear, but subsystem technologies are not mature enough to
advance to the next phase.
In addition to developing the ORD, the results of the CTD phase
include: the initial acquisition strategy, cost estimates, and
the program baseline. The acquisition strategy is an overall
plan which indicates program goals and serves as a roads-map for
the program. The program baseline contains key cost schedule
and performance parameters. Also, near the end of the CTD
phase, a risk assessment is conducted.
Successful completion of the CTD phase leads into Milestone B
and the System Development and Demonstration Phase (SDD).
2.3.2 Milestone B
Milestone B is normally the program initiation point for
acquisition projects. Program initiation requires: (1) a valid
requirement in an ORD; (2) mature technology; and (3) funding.
The two work efforts in the CDD phase are the System Integration
(SI) Phase and the System Demonstration (SD) phase.
2.3.3 Milestone C
Milestone C provides for low-rate initial production (for
applicable systems) or production and procurement. Two
approached to Full Operational Capability can be followed:
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single step or evolutionary. Evolutionary acquisition is the
preferred method.
Evolutionary acquisition develops initial core useful
capabilities called "blocks" and is broken into two approaches:
(1) full definition of capability for all blocks; or (2) full
definition of capability for block one only, with future block
requirements to be determined.
Evolutionary acquisition allows a reduced cycle time and speeds
delivery of advanced capability to the war fighter by allowing
the program to field the advanced capabilities in manageable
pieces. The time-phasing of the blocks allows for improved
capabilities over time through the insertion of new technologies
as they become available. This is especially useful when the
full required capability may not be known at the program outset.
Spiral development is an iterative process used to develop the
required capabilities within one block.
2.4 Option Thinking Opportunities
The current ship design and acquisition process includes some
option-like features. The process is time sequenced into
decision phases. The option to abandon is included at the
decision phases, but implementation of this option is not
usually considered and more money is added to a project to keep
in on the pre-determined track.
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The best portion of the cycle to apply options thinking is in
the Analysis of Alternatives (AoA), during the study of
operational effectiveness and lifecycle costs of various
alternatives that may be able to met mission area needs. The
AoA seeks to determine the most cost-effective way to meet the
mission needs and prevent the pre-determination of a solution to
a need via an independent scientific study. (Azama 2000).
The AoA is intended to aid the decision maker by showing the
relative advantages and disadvantages of alternatives being
considered and by showing the sensitivity of each alternative to
changes in key assumptions (threat) or variables (performance
parameters). It attempts to answer the question: "Are any of
the proposed alternatives of sufficient military benefit to be
worth the cost?" (U.S. Navy, Chief of Naval Operations 2001)
The AoA needs to be framed in such a way that advantages can be
compared to costs and evaluated to determine how much to
flexibility is worth. A recent AoA performed on the Joint
Command and Control ship (JCC(X)) provided the following
observations (Doerry and Sims 2002):
* A requirements risk analysis should be performed to
anticipate and mitigate the cost of changes in customer or
derived requirements.
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" Requirements that are likely to change over the service
life of the ship should be identified and plans developed
for dealing with these changing requirements.
" Rather than develop a system to meet a certain set of
requirements, as is typically done, the designer should aim
to develop a system that recognizes that requirements are
not always firm and change over time.
" To date, approaches for dealing with uncertainty in
requirements had been ad hoc such as using margins based on
past performance problems and indiscriminately mandating
open systems architectures or modularity.
In addition, the ability to enable Navy contracts to have the
flexibility in managing under an options framework, a non-
standard approach is necessary. One effort to address these
concerns was enacted under Section 845 of the National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1994. Section 845 provided the
Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency with temporary
authority to enter into agreements for prototype projects using
nonstandard contracting approaches referred to as "other
transactions." Other transactions are generally not subject to
the federal laws and regulations governing standard procurement
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contracts. Consequently, when using Section 845 authority, DOD
contracting officials are not required to include standard
contract provisions that typically address such issues as
financial management or intellectual property rights, but rather
may structure the agreements as they consider appropriate (U.S.
Government Account Office 2000).
These benefits included attracting firms that typically did not
contract with DOD, enabling use of commercial products or
processes, providing more flexibility to negotiate agreement
terms and conditions, and reducing program costs.
Terms and conditions found in Section 845 agreements provided
contractors more flexibility in the business processes and
practices they employed than typically provided by standard
contract provisions (U.S. Government Account Office 2000).
The Navy determined that because the ship incorporated numerous
new technologies, including new hull and propeller designs, it
could be considered a prototype for future efforts.
Changes in the agreements' value resulted from (1) decisions to
add work to the original agreement, (2) technical or schedule
problems that increased the effort's cost, or (3) termination of
the planned activity (U.S. Government Account Office 2000).
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The top three reasons cited by DOD components were use of
commercial products or processes, attracting commercial firms,
and increased flexibility in negotiating terms and conditions
(U.S. Government Account Office 2000).
For example, flexibility in negotiating terms and conditions-
particularly intellectual property and financial management
clauses-was viewed as the key determinant in attracting
commercial firms on several agreements. Standard contract or
provided contractors the flexibility to make performance trade-
offs needed to achieve a specific price goal. In other cases,
DOD officials also noted that the cost of their specific program
was reduced due to the cost-sharing provided by the recipients.
For example, they noted that Section 845 agreements allowed
recipients to apply independent research and development funds
to their specific program. For example, the Navy used a Section
845 agreement on its effort to develop a common cockpit for two
helicopters. The Navy wanted to develop the cockpit in a 2-year
time frame, but it could not do so because it did not have
sufficient funds to pay for tasks that needed to be completed in
the first year (U.S. Government Account Office 2000).
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Both take advantage of the flexibility afforded by the
agreements and protect the government's interests.
DOD a right to terminate a contract, either for its own
convenience or for default on the contractor's part; discusses
the rights and responsibilities of each party; and prescribes
various procedures for audits, property inventories, and
disposition, among other contract close-out procedures (U.S.
Government Account Office 2000).
Under a termination for convenience, the contractor is
compensated for the work done, including a reasonable profit. In
a default termination, the government determines that the
contractor has, or will, fail to perform its contractual
obligations. Consequently, the government is not liable for the
contractor's costs on undelivered work and is entitled to
repayment of funds provided for that work. However, DOD
infrequently terminates research contracts (U.S. Government
Account Office 2000).
In summary, the design and acquisition of Navy ships appears to
have opportunities for the application of options thinking
during the AoA phase, especially if the acquisition process can
be done under Section 845.
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CHAPTER 3 Real Options
Just as in the previous chapter where the current state of
acquisition and ship design was described in order to evaluate
where real options might be applied, this chapter seeks to
introduce and discuss real options theory to identify which
parts may be applicable for valuing flexibility in a naval ship
design and acquisition project.
"The future is uncertain... and in an uncertain environment,
having the flexibility to decide what to do after some of that
uncertainty is resolved definitely has value. Options-pricing
theory provides the means of assessing that value." (Merton
1997).
Engineering systems must deal with risk and risk aversion (de
Neufville 1999, 2001). Decision analysis and utility assessment
provide a basis for real options analysis that allows
flexibility to be designed into systems so that they can evolve
and provide the most effective performance even under changing
conditions (de Neufville 1999, 2001). The goal is to deign
systems to provide maximum value over time in presence of
uncertainty (de Neufville 1999, 2001). Flexibility provides the
way for system to continue to perform at maximum effectiveness
as conditions change (de Neufville 1999, 2001). The key is to
know what type of flexibility to incorporate into design and
when to exercise the flexibility (de Neufville 1999, 2001).
Real options allows designers to determine what types and amount
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of flexibility is justified in a system design (de Neufville
1999, 2001), by looking to determine system value over time in
the context of risk and uncertainty using decision analysis and
options analysis
A real options thinking approach builds more flexibility into
design by including the capability to change, without requiring
change. Given the rapid rate of technological change, it is
impossible to accurately forecast future conditions accurately,
and therefore, managers need to be able to reshape projects in
light of technical or market changes (Shishko and Ebbeler 1999).
This approach differs from the traditional view of project
valuation where decisions made at beginning of project are
followed and unchanged during life of project. Real options
recognize that managers make future decisions as uncertainty
becomes resolved (Neely and de Neufville 2001) and place greater
emphasis on the need to gather information to manage risks by
exploiting options at the right time.
Current project valuation techniques fail to capture several
important aspects of technical projects, including flexibility
and the interface between economics and technology. When
analyzing a project, both its technical and economic feasibility
must be addressed, as these aspects are generally intertwined.
For example, almost any project can be made technologically
feasible by spending exorbitant amounts of money on development.
Although the project may make technological sense, its financial
viability is undercut by the unreasonable development costs
(McVey 2002). On the other hand, after a conceptual project is
developed, it is important to determine what the potential value
to the client is and what they are willing to pay for it. A
program can be technically feasible and well managed, but if the
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program is producing a product for which there is little or no
market, it really has no value. Standard valuation methods tend
to underestimate project value by neglecting the options
embedded in them which allow managers to adapt and revise
decisions based upon new information or developments. Instead,
it is assumed that the current market is static with no new
competition or other technology developments, which would
suggest the need for adapting the project to meet the needs of
the market (McVey 2002).
Current valuations in naval ship design tend to focus on valuing
a point designed product. Although there have been efforts to
more completely explore the design space for the optimal
solution, the optimal solution is based on a fixed set or
requirements and preferences. In addition, optimization infers
certainty. There is no way in the current system to value
adding flexibility to the design, since under certainty,
flexibility has no value. Flexibility instead, has value, in
situations with high uncertainty.
Valuing a project using real options is analogous to climbing a
mountain in that getting to the top (i.e. coming up with an
"answer") is important, however, the process of climbing ,
including the lessons learned along the way are equally, if not
more, important (McVey 2002).
The goal of any valuation method for real options is to estimate
the value of having options to react to resolution of future
uncertainty. The underlying principles, which apply to options
analysis and decision analysis methods, can be seen as a general
framework to embed the value of flexibility into the estimation
of project value. It is important to note, that in a world of
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certainty, options have no value. Since real options thinking
refocuses on opportunities that are created by resolution of
future uncertainty (Faulkner 1996), the cornerstone of any
option valuation method is the ability to model the uncertainty
in the future states of nature (Lammassoure 2001). Real options
look to add value to projects by looking for scenarios beyond
the most likely one.
Two key organizational aspects in the implementation of real
options are:
(1) The decision to abandon a project (or part of a
project) must be taken seriously. The project management must
be prepared to drop a project that is no longer promising. This
is a difficult to implement organizationally, as projects tend
to develop own inertia and are hard to stop.
(2) Real options do not automatically justify spreading
available investment dollars and organizational effort over a
wide range of projects. For each project, the technical options
and market potential must be considered (Faulkner 1996).
3.1 Options
Prior to delving into 'real options', it is first necessary to
carefully define an 'option' itself. In this context, option
has a very exact meaning, different from 'choice' or
'alternative' as used in everyday language. Here an option is
defined as used in financial contracts, meaning "a right, but
not an obligation, to take some action now, or in the future,"
"under predefined arrangements." Options are widely used for
contracts of all kinds: financial instruments, commodities, and
services. All of the key features relating to an option are
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described by this definition. The asymmetric returns of options
are derived from the right to exercise the option only when
beneficial to the option holder. By holding an option, only
positive outcomes will be realized and downside losses
truncated. The exercise price is different from the cost to
acquire the option and since it is does not depend on later
conditions, can be compared to the instantaneous benefit of
exercising the option.
A few more definitions dealing with options are necessary. The
option to buy is referred to as a call option. The option to
sell is called a put option. If an option can only be exercised
on its expiration date, it is a European option. If the option
can be exercised at any time prior to or on the expiration date,
it is an American option. Most real options are like American
options, in that they can be exercised at any time.
A simple example using an American call option will illustrate
the important aspects of an option. Suppose you hold an option
on a stock whose current price is $10.00. The strike price, or
predetermined price you have agreed to buy the stock for is
$12.00. As the stock price moves due to market forces, the
option holder could exercise the option to buy when the stock
price exceeds the strike price, for example when the stock is
trading at $14.00. In this case, the option holder can buy the
stock for the pre-arranged price of $12.00 and immediately sell
it for $14.00, profiting the difference of $2.00 less the cost
to acquire the option in the beginning. The asymmetry of
returns comes from not being required to exercise the option
when the stock price is below the strike price. If the stock
price drops to $6.00, the option would not be exercised, and
losses would be limited to the cost of acquiring the option.
45
The options scenario contrasts that of purchasing the stock
outright, where the stock holder's losses are not limited and
the entire investment could be lost if the stock price falls.
3.2 Real Options
Real options are a method for valuing projects with future
decision opportunities (Oueslati 1999). Real options were
derived from financial options and apply to physical things
rather than financial instruments. Real options apply the basic
principles of financial options, but adapt them to the concept
of system design, which generally deals with a unique project
that lacks historical data (de Neufville 1999, 2001).
Real options in a project refer to any aspects of the system
that provide flexibility and can be designed into projects
conceptually, or physically. Conceptual options exist as part
of any development project whenever investments involve
strategic choices over time that managers can actively direct
(Neely and de Neufville 2001). Physical real options are any
design characteristic that provides flexibility.
The real options approach is based on financial options
valuation techniques to value real projects that have risky or
contingent future cash flows or benefits, as well as long-term
projects with opportunities for managerial intervention (McVey
2002). In a real options valuation, technology developments are
treated as assets whose payoffs are uncertain, but provide the
potential for spectacular returns with limited losses (Shishko
and Ebbeler 1999). Because options have value, they must be
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paid for, either with a monetary cost, or by a design penalty,
such as increased size or complexity. The prospect of high
gains with losses potentially limited to the nominal cost of
acquiring the options is attractive for system design. Real
options, like their financial counterparts have more value with
increasing uncertainty (de Neufville 1999, 2001). Real options
recognizes there are situations where uncertainty represents a
potential for future gain, rather than risk of loss and the
larger amount of uncertainty, the greater the opportunity for
value creation (Faulkner 1996). The real options approach
considers both the technical and market aspects of a project in
estimating the value of flexibility in the system (de Neufville
1999, 2001). Real options seek to give greater strategic
flexibility to projects within limited budgets (Shishko and
Ebbeler 1999). The recognition and exploitation of flexibility
through real options unlocks fundamental value in risky projects
(Neely and de Neufville 2001).
Real options value technology investments by accounting for the
flexibility they can offer under considerable uncertainty and
thereby can capture value that goes unrecognized by usual
valuation methods (Shishko and Ebbeler 1999). Real options also
uncover the contribution of active management as a source of
value by recognizing that system operators can and do actively
manager their systems (Neely and de Neufville 2001).
By calculating the value of added flexibilities, the decision
makers have a firm rational for accepting or rejecting them,
rather than the current practice which has been mainly
conceptual and intuitive (de Neufville 1999, 2001). Options
thinking as a conceptual tool helps to explain the strategic
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value of intangibles such as active management, flexibility,
learning, etc. (Faulkner 1996).
The options thinking approach to uncertainty reframes the
approach to design. No longer is the design goal to minimize
risk, but rather to seek out and exploit opportunities. A real
options approach is proactive towards uncertainties and prepares
plans to manage risk, rather than to react to it.
Conventionally good design minimizes risk, but options seek to
maximize reward. By looking at sources of uncertainty for
situations that can be exploited, designers are led to add more
flexibility than is current practice (de Neufville 1999, 2001).
Real options also force a longer term focus on design by
providing the potential for options chains on future options
(Faulkner 1996).
Options thinking recognizes future managerial flexibility by
identifying downstream decisions that can be made after future
uncertainty is resolved. Recognizing that these decisions are
conditional on upstream decisions and that future course changes
are probable, active management that can quickly adapt by
monitoring the resolution of uncertainties to help understand
which scenario is unfolding and anticipating course adjustments
will be required (Faulkner 1996).
For managing technology projects, much of the analysis lies in
determining when and how to implement options. This analysis
is broken into three phases: discovery, selection and
monitoring. In these ways, real options seek opportunities to
build flexibility into designs, evaluate the possibilities, and
implement the best ones, without being required to do so.
The essential advantages of real options are that they:
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(1) embody flexibility, and
(2) permit managers to achieve favorably biased returns.
Real options provide the most value to projects with the
following characteristics:
(1) Contingent investment decisions based on the resolution
of some uncertainty
(2) Uncertainty is large enough to cause the need for
flexibility and waiting for resolution adds value and
minimizes regret
(3) Value captures the possibility of future growth options
(4) Project has opportunities for updates and mid-course
corrections
(5) Decisions enable further project development without
committing to it prematurely
(6) Can adjust systems as needed when more relevant
information becomes available
(7) Greatest for risky projects, especially when later
implantation costs are relatively large
(8) Future investments and commitments are relatively large
compared to the investment required to resolve some
uncertainty
(9) Can anticipate availability of future information that
will resolve some uncertainty
(10) Duration of research phase is long and there is
uncertainty about future earnings
(11) Ability to abort poorly performing projects truncates
downside risk and increases expected value of project.
Also allows for augmentation of upside.
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3.3 Valuation Methods for Real Options
When determining the value of real options, some form of
decision analysis underlies the evaluation, either alone or
combined with a financial options analysis (de Neufville 1999,
2001). Due to the many approximations and assumptions necessary
to calculate a real option value, real options necessarily
produce approximate rather than precise values. In the case of
system design where alternative are compared against one
another, these approximations do not greatly detract from the
value of the method. The most important focus of real options
is on the options thinking aspect of designing flexibility to
deal with uncertainty, rather than designing to optimize which
assumes certainty. Also, realizing that options value depends
largely on market conditions shifts the focus of the system
designer from a pure engineering analysis to one that accounts
for uncertain market conditions (de Neufville 1999, 2001).
Whatever method used, it may still not be possible to set out a
theoretical framework when attempting to value several different
options types, as the interactions between options is difficult
to gauge (Ouselatti 1999).
3.3.1 Decision Analysis
Decision analysis is a standard approach to system planning and
design under uncertainty (de Neufville 1999, 2001); however it
is not used in naval ship design and acquisition. Decision
analysis is a straightforward method of laying out future
decisions that are not set from the start but can depend on the
resolution of some uncertain parameter(s). It can account for
multiple sources of uncertainty and uses probability estimates
of future outcomes to determine the value of a project (McVey
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2002). Decision analysis presents the problem as an array of
time-phased risks and determines the best reaction to
uncertainties as they are resolved to develop the strategy which
maximizes performance over time. A great virtue of decision
analysis is that it can deal with multiple scenarios and
management decisions and truncates specific lines of development
in order to limit losses. Although decision analysis is
generally reactive, providing best choice under given
circumstances, the incorporation of options seeks to identify
new paths and change the decision tree by adding flexibility.
The real options approach inserts additional decision nodes to
reflect options available to the decision maker (Neely 1998).
Decision analysis holds three significant advantages over
options analysis in that there is no need to identify an
underlying asset that properly mimics the projects risk profile
that the scenarios and strategies are laid out in an easy to
explain and understand manner, and that the lognormal
distribution is not required to describe the uncertainty. In
fact, uncertainty can be modeled by any appropriate distribution
(Faulkner 1996). By making the analysis more visible to the
decision maker, the counter-intuitive outcomes of increased
value for increased risk are less surprising (Faulkner 1996).
Also, the decision tree serves as a dynamic road-map for the
project. In laying out managerial decision points, the method
takes into account managerial flexibility. The major drawbacks
cited against decision analysis are that the discount rates are
theoretically incorrect and constant and also that the estimates
for the subjective probability distributions used are
potentially hard to justify and form with precision. The
approximate value of the option can still be determined by
51
comparing the value of the flexible decision tree to the
baseline non-flexible case (Lammassoure 2001).
Decision tree analysis is easily generalized to situations in
which value is not monetary. Decision Tree Analysis is part of
the Decision Analysis framework, which is active in developing
Utility function approaches. This makes the method particularly
suited for system design applications. By considering only the
optimal decision after each possible state of nature, decision
analysis takes into account the possibility of adapting future
decisions based on the resolution of uncertain parameters, which
solves the main shortcoming of traditional valuation
(Lammassoure 2001).
Valuing real options with decision tree analysis does have
limitations. For the decision analysis to remain practical,
there must be a finite number of decision nodes, occurring at
set decision times. Because of these constraints, decision trees
cannot account for flexibility where continuous decision making
is required. Additionally, there must be a finite number of
possible future states that describe the event nodes. Again, the
decision tree cannot account for uncertain parameters that can
take on a continuous set of values, such as market demand
(Lammassoure 2001). In order to accommodate these limitations,
it has been suggested that decision analysis becomes more
computationally difficult when more than three or four sources
of uncertainty are involve (Oueslati 1999)
Although the results of decision analysis are theoretically
incorrect, since the discount rate is not constantly adjusted,
the concept of added flexibility is more important than the
mechanical flaw in the analysis (de Neufville 1999, 2001).
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Decision analysis can still deal well with a range of outcomes
and the asymmetry of returns offered by options. In system
planning and design, where large system performance
uncertainties are the key value drivers, rather than uncertain
cash flows, the discount rate adjustments can probably be
disregarded (de Neufville 1999, 2001). Additionally, when the
calculations based on assumptions for future markets and
technology requires sensitivity analysis, adjusting the discount
rate for risk can also probably be ignored (de Neufville 1999,
2001). Even when options analysis methods can be applied to the
market risks, project risks does not require discount rate
adjustments to reflect unavoidable risk, since managers must
diversify their project portfolio so that unexpected losses from
one project can be compensated for by gains in another (Neely
and de Neufville 2001). In any case, a decision analysis
framework underlies the valuation of options, whether or not a
financial options evaluation can be applied or not.
3.3.2 Options Analysis
In so much as a decision analysis approach fails to properly
adjust the discount rate and provide a proper risk-neutral
probability distribution, these are the major advantages of a
financial options analysis. Although these advantages are of
the utmost importance when dealing with financial instruments,
or even with projects where the major sources of value and
uncertainty can be closely aligned with traded securities,
identifying the proper underlying asset is difficult, if not
impossible for most real projects. Also, the background of the
decision makers must be accounted for when selecting a valuation
method. In the case where the key decision makers do not have a
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background in finance, the application of options analysis to
real projects can seem obscure.
Options theory was initially developed to value traded
securities such as stocks, which can take on continuous possible
values. Therefore options analysis models account for continuous
probability density functions, as well as for continuous
decision making (Lamassoure 2001).
Real options theory has not, with few exceptions, been used
directly outside of the commercial world (Lamassoure 2001).
This is because one of the baseline assumptions in the
underlying financial options analysis is that the goal of every
firm is to increase the wealth of its shareholders and as such,
options analysis has never been interested in capturing non-
monetary values. In order to apply options pricing methods to
real situations, there must be an underlying asset, whose
behavior on the stock market mimics the value and risk of the
real project. Therefore, financial options theory cannot be
directly applied to all kinds of investment-making situations,
in particular not to most system design situations. In these
cases, the approximating the options valuation using a decision
analysis framework is recommended.
As previously discussed, unique project risks can be diversified
by holding a portfolio of projects, however, market risks cannot
be diversified away (Neely and de Neufville 2001) . Because of
this, only options analysis is able to treat market risks
properly. In order to use the options analysis method, detailed
statistical information on the price and volatility of an
underlying asset which closely reflects project is required.
Identifying a proper underlying asset is the key to carrying out
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an options analysis, and therefore the hurdle to applying
options analysis to most real projects.
Options analysis transforms risky outcomes to risk neutral
valuations that then can be evaluated with standard decision
analysis (Neely and de Neufville 2001). Determining the risk
neutral probabilities requires building a portfolio of value-
producing assets which replicates future-state values. For the
private sector, value-producing assets are typically a portfolio
of risk less and risky securities projected to respond in the
future period so as to reflect the value of the private sector
project. In principle there is no restriction to securities.
Portfolio could include private sector projects for which it is
possible to asset credible future-state values under conditions
assumed when projecting future-state values.
For public sector projects, the endogenous risks can be
classified as development risks, i.e. cost, schedule, technical
performance, while programmatic (market) risks can be attributed
to changes in how end-users might value the project and how it
will be used. The programmatic risk can be related to society's
willingness to pay for the public good derived from the project.
As with private sector project, the overall success depends on
both the development success and the market success. The option
value must reflect uncertainty and quantitatively account for
technology readiness and cost (Shishko and Ebbeler 1999).
In order to evaluate the market risk for products traded in
ordinary markets, an options analysis approach requires
extensive historical data on an underlying asset. Applying the
options analysis is made difficult when the right data is not
available (Neely and de Neufville 2001). Even when applied to
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private sector cases, the value added by a properly risk
adjusted options analysis may not be worth the considerable
effort required to collect and analyze this data. Also, the
options analysis may give a false sense of precision to the
valuation that may not be warranted, based on the uncertainty in
the underlying data (de Neufville 1999, 2001).
An options valuation using Black-Scholes, or the binomial method
is easily applied, assuming the proper data is available. The
problem with liberally applying these methods to many cases is
that the underlying assumptions may not hold. For instance,
these methods assume that the future value of the project will
follow a Brownian motion. Another significant assumption of
options analysis is that the future uncertainty can be described
by a lognormal distribution, and while this appears to be
reasonable for describing the volatility of stock prices, it may
not always be appropriate for describing the uncertainty
associated with the with real projects (Faulkner 1996).
The addition of real options to a project changes the designers'
and managers' thinking in dealing with uncertainty by
recognizing that uncertainty adds value to options. Options
seek opportunities to add value to the project by exploiting
options at right time. By adapting a different perspective on
system design for uncertainty, designers and managers will
recognize that flexible projects are more valuable than
previously considered. Real options provide a way in which to
value this flexibility that other project valuation methods lack
and shows the desirability of gathering information about
uncertainty in order to know when to best exploit the options as
the uncertainty becomes resolved (de Neufville 1999, 2001).
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CHAPTER 4 A Real Options Approach to Navy Ship
Acquisition
This chapter will determine the best way to implement a real
options design and evaluation method for naval ship design and
acquisition.
The cases for real options in naval ship design and acquisition
do not meet the requirements necessary to apply financial
options analysis techniques, but rather options thinking.
Attempting to apply financial techniques where they are not
appropriate will not yield a better result than a decision
analysis method that fails to properly adjust the discount rate.
In fact, the financial options analysis methods (Black-Scholes,
binomial, etc.) have many underlying assumptions and criteria
that must be met for their proper use. One must be careful not
to use these methods unless the real options valuation problem
is very similar to the one encountered in finance (de Neufville
and Scholtes 2002).
A significant portion of the theoretical basis for the option-
pricing approach for valuing real projects relies on the idea of
being able to replicate that project in a portfolio comprised of
risk-less and risky securities so that the risk neutral
probabilities can be calculated. Proper valuation of the
project is essential, as differences between the selling price
of the project and the value of the replicating portfolio would
create an immediate arbitrage opportunity. A key hurdle that
must be overcome in order to apply the option-pricing method in
the public sector relies on assembling a replicating portfolio
for the projects. This assertion raises two important questions.
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First, are these projects so risky that are replicating
portfolio cannot be found. A second question is whether a
government agency should be risk-neutral altogether without
regard to whether uncertainties are hedged or not, or in other
words, does the public sector aspect make the case for risk
neutral valuation?
The questions raised above deal with the risk-neutral aspects of
options-pricing. Risk-neutral investors are investors that do
not require a risk premium. There is debate whether
governmental agencies fall into this category. If it is assumed
that they do, however, all costs for government projects can
therefore be discounted at the risk-free interest rate.
Another important aspect of the application to ship design and
acquisition is due to the fact that the decision process for a
military mission differs greatly from that in the commercial
world. To begin, the project (mission) value is not a measure of
revenues minus cost, but rather takes the form of a complex
utility function which incorporates cost. Thus, value does not
have the same linear properties as the cases studied by option-
pricing theory. Additionally, there are two possible decision
processes when deciding to acquire military systems. When
designing a military system during a peace-time, the preferred
design is the one which the maximizes the mission effectiveness
per cost. When making a decision about an operational military
mission involved in contingencies, however, the cost factor
becomes much less critical than the mission effectiveness. In
the second case, the design that maximizes mission effectiveness
is generally chosen.
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To begin with, it is not possible to find a representative
underlying asset that could be applied in these cases. For
projects lacking historical data, assumptions can be made and
adjusted for with sensitivity analysis. Real options lead to
approximate, rather than precise values, so for comparisons, the
niceties of greater precision potentially derive from historical
data can be ignored (de Neufville 1999, 2001). Also, there is no
arbitrage opportunity, which is another requirement for applying
options analysis. Even without arbitrage, it has been suggested
that governmental projects should be discounted at the risk-free
rate (Shisko and Ebbeler 1999, Lamassoure 2001) . Additionally,
the options methods assume a log-normal distribution for the
values, which may be appropriate for stock prices, but not
proper for most real projects (Faulkner 1996, de Neufville 1999,
2001). Even when options analysis can be used, the manner in
which several real options may interact may be difficult to set
out in a theoretically correct way (Oueslatti 1999). For this
reason, as well as the amount of time and data required (which
may not be available), focusing on the options "thinking" aspect
and using a decision analysis framework may be most appropriate
(de Neufville 1999, 2001).
Decision analysis allows any appropriate distributions to be
used. For strategic decisions, such as are required in the
naval ship acquisition process, decision analysis provides a
method for altering choices as uncertainty becomes resolved.
Decision analysis provides not only the expected path, but shows
that decision makers the range of possible outcomes, from the
best to worst case results. Constructing the decision tree
permits plans to be analyzed that exploit opportunities, but
also allow a hedge to avoid losses.
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Decision analysis also has many advantages. First, decision
analysis is easily generalized to situations in which the
important values are non-monetary (Lamassoure 2001). Secondly,
decision analysis is better suited for strategic decisions such
as those required for naval ship design and acquisition than are
financial techniques (de Neufville and Scholtes 2002).
Decision trees are a valid method for valuing real options (de
Neufville 1999, 2001, Neely 1998, Oueslati 1999). The major
deficiency of a decision analysis framework for evaluating
options is that the decision tree assumes a constant discount
rate, or an adjusted discount rate must be calculated every time
a decision can be made, which is impractical. In the case of
naval ship design and acquisition, as in system planning and
design, in the context of large uncertainties in system
performance and other factors, the deficiencies in the discount
rate can be ignored (de Neufville 1999, 2001). Additionally, by
validating the results through sensitivity analysis, adjusting
the discount rate for varying levels of risk can probably be
ignored (de Neufville 1999, 2001).
A second problem cited for using decision analysis for
evaluating options is that the decision tree must have a finite
number of decision nodes, occurring at set times, and cannot
therefore account for outcomes with an infinite possible number
of states, such as stock prices or market demand (Lamassoure
2001). Again, this problem is not critical when taken in the
context of naval ship design and acquisition. The decisions
necessary to describe and value the design and acquisition
process do, within a reasonable approximation, occur at discrete
and quantifiable time intervals. Additionally, the future
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states, although continuous in reality, must be approximated in
application to a set of finite likely realities.
Neely's hybrid method and its expansion by Oueslati both allow
for pure decision analysis when it is the appropriate method, as
determined by the factors above, using decision trees.
Here are the basics for the method:
(1) Identify options
(2) Identify major uncertainties
(3) Determine possible end states (markets)
(4) Determine major decision points
(5) Layout decision tree
(6) Determine decision rule (for example, MAUA for OMOE/COST;
pure OMOE/COST; max OMOE with cost constraint; criteria
meet minimum requirements)
(7) Sensitivity analysis (test assumed probabilities and
distributions to find when decisions would change)
Method
(1) Determine requirements (min/max), preferences, and
scenarios
(2) Create designs based on requirements/preferences
(3) Translate design parameters into cost/OMOE estimates for
scenarios
(4) Transform customer preferences for OMOE/cost using utility
(5) Calculate Willingness To Pay (WTP) for base case
(6) Layout scenarios and decisions in tree
(7) Roll back tree with WTP to determine value of option
compared to base case
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The method described above will be applied to a case study,
described in Chapter 5.
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CHAPTER 5 Application of the Real Options
Method to Naval Ship Design and Acquisition
5.1 Introduction
Naval ship design and acquisition decision making involves
multiple ship types, multiple technologies with simultaneous
development paths, multiple missions, requirements uncertainty,
mission uncertainty, budget uncertainty, technology readiness
uncertainty. It is estimated that 80% of a ships cost is
determined during concept design (McCord and Amy 2001) . During
the design and acquisition phase, decisions must be made with
incomplete/uncertain information. The use of new technology
(i.e. hull forms) makes concept exploration more difficult and
uncertain. Program managers would like a system architecture
and development plan with the ability to estimate ramifications
of future outcomes prior to execution, flexibility to react to
changes in mission, requirements, technology, budget, and
minimal need to redo design process for future outcome changes.
The key output of the process is not the specification of an
optimal ship design, but rather a design process that is used to
investigate feasibility and flexibility in design options. The
system architecture would identify a range of solution
flexibility. It would investigate concept flexibility against
requirements such as payload mix, platform performance, and
technology insertion. The process would also investigate the
impact on concept architecture, such as platform performance;
that is, determining whether the flexibility gained is worth the
cost.
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The hull form of a naval combatant itself cannot be flexible
once laid down, but the subsystems, such as payload, can
introduce flexibility. The cost of an option is embedded in the
design features that add flexibility. Additional size, weight,
and complexity in the design model are reflected as additional
cost as compared to inflexible base design. Results of an
options analysis provide a recommended path of development or
choice between competing designs based on cost of flexibility
compared with value returned. Value is based on the parameters
of future state and likelihood of reaching that state.
Additionally, uncertainty in design development, costs, timing,
and performance characteristics can be modeled using appropriate
distributions. What may seem like a simple intuitive exercise
requires a structured, efficient method to deal with the
possible situations. People generally do not deal well when
evaluating complex, uncertain situations because they tend to
focus on extremes and end states, rather than the process (de
Neufville et al 2000, 2001). It is difficult to evaluate the
interaction of many different probabilities at once without a
structured method such as a decision tree. The case study
implements the method on a hypothetical case study that is
similar to the current Navy acquisition of advanced high-speed
surface craft.
5.2 Case Study
According to the Department of the Navy, the primary purpose of
forward deployed naval forces is to project power from the sea
to influence events ashore. To be successful, our naval forces
must be able to gain access to, and operate in the littoral
regions of, potential adversaries. Consequently, they must be
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able to detect and neutralize enemy sea mines and submarines,
and to protect themselves against cruise missiles and other
anti-ship weapons. Finally, they must be able to launch and
support offensive operations against enemy forces ashore (U.S.
GAO 2001).
The key cost driver is the type of capabilities necessary for a
ship to effectively perform its intended missions against
anticipated threats. Procurement of combat and weapon systems
with the necessary capabilities has comprised a large percentage
of a surface combatant's basic construction cost. For example,
combat and weapon systems account for about 55 percent of the
cost of the latest version of the Arleigh Burke-class destroyer.
Navy officials indicate that the Aegis combat system is a large
cost-at about $235 million, or about 25 percent of the ship's
cost (U.S. GAO 1997b).
By tailoring the capability of a ship concept, a lesser capable
ship with high capability in one or two missions areas, but
limited or virtually no capability in other areas results. It
would provide capability in mission areas requiring large
numbers of ships, such as antisubmarine warfare, rather than
those capabilities already sufficiently available in the fleet.
One version, an antisubmarine ship, would be a smaller, frigate-
type ship equipped with state-of-the-art antisubmarine systems,
sufficient anti-surface warfare capabilities, and basic self-
defense capabilities in other warfare areas (U.S. GAO 1997b).
By creating, either modular ships, or an ability to acquire
varying levels of tailored ships, a flexible force structure can
be achieved.
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One shipyard, Blohm and Voss have developed a modular system
(MEKO) aimed at production flexibility which is not variable on
a mission to mission basis, but allows significant advantages to
the shipyard which can configure or outfit a standard ship to
meet varying needs of diverse customers (Skvarla et al 2001).
Another method than Blohm and Voss modularity could be to limit
the tactical operations of small, faster surface combatants to
comprise a fleet mix.
Combining modularity with smaller ship size could also create
versatile ships, reconfigurable for different missions over
several months using modules. Regional crises require agile,
flexible response to meet a wide number of tasks. Design for
flexibility to be reconfigured in a number of hours to do a
multitude of missions for a lower cost. The Navy seeks to
maximize operational flexibility across a wide range of tasks by
reconfiguring modules in a single, cost-effective baseline hull
(Natter 2002).
Several alternatives of high speed, smaller ships will be
explored to determine a best mix through the real options
method. Typical hull forms include the Joint Venture, LCS(X)
and SEA SLICE.
Some specifications for the Joint Venture are (Natter 2002):
Speed 38-48 knots
Draft 12 feet
Payload 400-1200 tons
Range 1200-4000 NM
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LCS(X) is a small specialized variant of the DD(X) family which
will take advantage of newest generation hull form with
modularity and scalability. It will focus on mission
capabilities, affordability, and life-cycle cost. (Global
Security 2002)
As of Mid 2001, the Office of Naval Research has released the
following design specifications for LCS(X) (Global Security
2002)
Displacement 500-60 tons
Draft 10 feet
Range 400 NM
Speed 50-60 knots
Cost $90 million (at least)
Sea SLICE is one prototype design being considered for the
LCS(X). It provides speed, stability, and modularity for
shallow-water mine counter-measures, littoral anti-submarine
warfare, anti-boat swarm attack. Other characteristics include:
Stability at speeds up to 30 knots
Reconfigurable to mission by using modules
The method will be applied to a set of notional high speed ship
platforms, with no particular hull form in mind.
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5.3 Case Study Input Parameters
The study considered six hull types, designated A though F, some
with variants indexed by numbers, which yielded a total of 16
variants. The six base hull forms were chosen to span the
reasonable set of possible hull types shown in Figure 5-1, from
surface effect ship through multi-hull and small water-plane
special displacement ships.
aE R NO U L L I ARCHIMEDES
Aerostatic support Hydrodynamic support it
I  ConventionalSurface effect Displacement Special Displacement
I Hydrofoil
Surface effect
captureoDeep dlsjplacement
Planing Catamaran ult 'hull4
'piercing fofts
Approximete spend range potential Small waterplane
Knots $0.100 60-40 40-2S 305 15
Surface Ship Types (from Gilmer and Johnson 1982)
Figure 5-1
The performance parameters and war fighting capabilities
analyzed were determined as summarized in Table 5-1. The
physical design characteristics are self-explanatory. The
mission area attributes are Anti-Surface Warfare (ASUW), Strike
Warfare (STK), and Mine Warfare (MIW). Radar Cross-Section
(RCS) is also included as a mission characteristic. All mission
and sea-keeping characteristics are assigned a value between 0
and 1, based on an estimate of that hull form's suitability to
support that mission area.
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Table 5-1
Design Characteristics Determination
Characterictic
Calm Water knots
Speed
Speed in Waves knots
Payload Weight long tons
Range at Speed nautical miles
in Waves
Displacement long tons
Hullborne feet
Draft
Foilborne /feet
Cushionborne
Rough Order of .millions
Magnitude Cost
ASUW
STK
MIW
RCS
STABILITY
Next, a ship synthesis tool was used to obtain a series of
balanced designs, the results of which are summarized in Tables
5-2 through 5-4.
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Table 5-2
Summary of Design Variant Characteristics (Part 1)
A&2 1 B2 B3
Calm Water
Speed knots 53. 537 42.7 43.3 42.4
Speed in Waves knots 50.0 SO.0 40.0 40.0 38.1
Payload Weight long 250 250 250 250 250
tons
Range at Speed nautical
inWvs mls18 213343 2653 1913in Waves miles
Displacement long 4164 2000 4000 3000 2000
tons
Hullborne Draft feet 15.4 14 2 25.9 23.5 20.5
Rough Order of
Hagnitude Cost millions $655 $159.95 $152.35 $142.95
ASUW 0.8 0.8 0.7 0.7 0.7
STK 0.7 0,7 0.4 0.4 0.4
MIW 0.3 0.8 0.4 0.4 0.4
RCS 0.6 0.6 0.8 0.8 0.8
STABILITY 018 0.A 0.4 0.4 0.4
Table 5-3
Summary of Design Variant Characteristics (Part 2)
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Calm Water
Speed knots
Speed in Waves knots
Payload Weight long
tons
Range at Speed nautical
in Waves miles
Displacement long
tons
Hullborne Draft feet
Rough Order of millions
Magnitude Cost
ASUW
STK
IW
RCS
STABILITY
Summary of Design Variant Characteristics
Ca WaterE 
E4
Speed knots 53.1 51,4 53.8 54.1
Speed in Waves knots 49.5 ,. 50,0
Payload Weight long 250 250 5 50tons
Range at Speed nautical
in Waves miles 99Z-418
Displacement 3483 1"8 3000 2000tons
Hullborne Draft feet 13.e 14.4 13.1 11,4
Rough Order ofmilions $160.85 172.25 $164.25 $152.S
Magnitude Costmilos- 4
ASUV 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6
STK 0.6 ti.6 0.6 Q.6
N'I 0.6 0. 6 06 0.6
RCS 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5
STABILITY Q.8 0.8 0,6 0.8
Next, the Overall Measure of Effectiveness (OMOE)
design was calculated for each of three scenarios
(Part 3)
F1 F2
50.0 50.0
50.0 50.0
250 250
1441 902
2854 2000
21.1 18.7
$165.95 $154.45
0.7 0.7
0.6 0.6
0.6 0.6
0.6 0.6
0.6 0.6
for
A,
each
B, C.
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D1
54.3
50.0
250
663
1000
26.1
$134.75
0.8
0.7
0.4
0.8
0.8
Table 5-4
The OMOE was calculated using the Analytic Hierarchical Process
(AHP) for each scenario as shown in Figures 5-2 through 5-4.
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MOE MOE Criteria MOP MOP
AHP NaCer AHP Attribute MOP Threshold MOP Goal Remarks
Weight Name Weight Name
0.069 Maximum
0.111 Mobility
031 Speed in
0.011 D raft |
0.075 Pa load
0. 27 Sustainability
0.052 Endurance1102 Range
0.025
0. 50 Margins
0.025 KMI
Overall
MOEi
0.300 AuW |
. 6 STK
0. 51 Mission
0.075 Mlw
0.200 RCS
0.261 Survivability
0.061 Stability
40
35
30
200
500
5
0.25
0
60 knots
50 knots
9 ft
300 long tons
4000 nm
10 %
0.5 ft
1
0
0
0
0
AHP Process for Determining OMOE (Scenario A)
Figure 5-2
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1
1
1
MOE MOE Criteria MOP MOP
AlHP N Al-P Attribute MOP Threshold MOP Goal Remarks
Weight Name Weight Name
Maximum
0.011 Speed
0.111 Mobility
Speed In
.0311 Waves
0.069 Draft
0.052 Payload
0. 27 Sustainability
Endurance
0.075 Range
Weight
0.025 Margin
0. 50 Margins
0.025 KG Margin
Overall
MOEi
0.076 ASuW
.0 STK
0. 51 Mission
0.075 MIW
0.131 RCS
0.261 Survivability
0.131 Stability
40
35
30
200
S00
0.25
60 knots
50 knots
9 ft
300 long tons
4000 nm
10 %
0.5 ft
0
0
0
0
0
AHP Process for Determining OMOE (Scenario B)
Figure 5-3
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1
1
MOE MOE Criteria MOP MOP
AHP NEme AHP Attribute MOP Threshold MOP Goal Remarks
Weight Name Weight Name
0.069 Maximum
0.111 Mobility
031 Speed in
0.011 Draft
0.052 Payload
0. 27 Sustainability
0.075 Endurance
.05 Range
0.025 Aeut
0. 50 Margins
0.025 KG Margin
Overall'
MOEI
0.076 ASuW |
. 75 | STK |
0. 51 Mission
0.300 MIMI
0.174 RCS
0.261 Survivability
0.007 Stability
40
35
30
200
60 knots
50 knots
9 ft
300 long tons
500 4000
5
0.25
0
10 %
0.5 ft
1
0
0
0
0
AHP Process for Determining OMOE (Scenario C)
Figure 5-4
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nm
1
1
1
The OMOE from the AHP method along with the cost calculated by
the synthesis model were combined using the single-attribute
utility functions shown in Figure 5-5, in order to determine the
Multi-Attribute Utility (MAU) for each design.
UOMOE 0.5 I
I I I o1
200 150 100 50 0
cost ($ million)
- /
0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
ONOE
Utility functions for Cost and OMOE
Figure 5-5
The OMOE, cost, and Utility results for each design are
summarized in Tables 5-5 through 5-7.
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UCOST 0.5
/
fl -
II
Table 5-5
Summary of Design Variant OMOE and UTILITY (Part 1)
ONOE Scenario A
ONOE Scenario B
OBOE Scenario C
Rough Orderof millions
Magnitude Cost
UTILITY Scenario A
UTILITY Scenario B
UTILITY Scenario C
BI B2 B3
0.582 0.575 0.559
0.470 0.463 0.453
0.501 0.490 0.468
$159.95 $152.35 $142.95
0.370 0.371 0.368
0.307 0.310 0.312
0.322 0.322 0.319
Table 5-6
Summary of Design Variant OMOE and UTILITY
OMOE Scenario A
OBOE Scenario B
OBOE Scenario C
Rough Order of millions
Magnitude Cost
UTILITY Scenario A
UTILITY Scenario B
UTILITY Scenario C
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(Part 2)
Table 5-7
Summary of Design Variant OMOE and UTILITY
ONOE Scenario A .569 0,568 0.55
ONCE Scenario B 0.544 0,549 0.539 0,526
OKOE Scenario C 0.559 0.561 0,554 G. 538
UTILITY Scenario A 4
S3 0.35 0.3$7 030
UTILITY Scenario B
UTILITY Scenario C
.. . ..31O,45 ,$.036
(Part 3)
F1 F2
0.592 0.546
0.518 0.515
0.549 0.539
$165.95 $154.45
0.372 0.351
0.326 0.333
0.343 0.347
The results summarized above were then analyzed using two
methods to determine which design should be selected as best for
each scenario (A, B, and C) . The first process is one typically
used by the MIT 13A program when selecting preferred design
variants. The method plots the OMOE versus cost in order to
determine a Pareto frontier. The best design is selected as the
one which is on the Pareto frontier and closest to the ideal
point. The resulting plots are shown in Figures 5-12 through 5-
14.
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Figure 5-6
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Figure 5-7
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Using the Pareto method, for all three scenarios, the preferred
platform would be design D1.
The second method used was to select the preferred platform from
each scenario by choosing the design with the highest Utility.
This method is straight forward and the preferred design for
each scenario is highlighted in the results already presented in
Tables 5-5 through 5-7. The preferred designs using the utility
method are Dl for scenario A, C2 for scenario B and A2 for
scenario C. These three designs will from this point forward be
designated as HULL I, HULL II, and HULL III, respectively.
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5.4 Options Thinking Applied
As discussed above, when applying the Pareto analysis to
determine which design to choose, the same hull was selected for
all three scenarios. When factoring in the war fighter's
changing preference for both characteristic and risk profile
using the MAU method, a different design was preferred for each
of the three scenarios. Since the future is uncertain, the
remaining analyses in this paper deal with determining the value
of having the flexibility to switch between producing one or
more of the three preferred designs as the scenario changes (or
remains the same) over one time period.
The MAU function that combines the user's preference for the
single attribute utilities can be used to determine the user's
Willingness to Pay (WTP) for a more preferred design over a less
preferred design, e.g. a design with a higher Utility compared
to one with a lower Utility. Figure 5-9 shows how the Utility
for any combination of OMOE and cost vary, based on the two war
fighter single-utility functions for those attributes described
above. As shown by the plotted iso-Utility lines, Utility
increases as one moves across the plot from left to right and
bottom to top.
In order to determine the war fighter's willingness to pay for
one design over another, the preferred design is compared to a
base case design with a known Utility. A graphical
representation of the calculation of the WTP is shown in Figure
5-10. The method for determining WTP begins by starting with
the cost of the preferred design, i.e. the one with the higher
Utility. From the cost axis, a vertical line is drawn which
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Iso-Utility Curves for cost and OMOE
Figure 5-9
reaches the OMOE which places the end of the line on the
preferred design's iso-utility line. At this point, the cost,
which when combined with the preferred design's OMOE would yield
the base case Utility, must be determined. This is accomplished
by connecting a horizontal line across from the preferred
design's iso-utility line to the base case iso-utility line. At
this point, a line is dropped to the cost axis and the
difference between the preferred design's cost and the cost
determined by this method represents the WTP.
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Figure 5-10
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Figure 5-11 represents the case when the selected design has a
lower Utility than the base case. In this instance, the WTP is
negative, inferring that the user selecting that design would
have over- paid for the selected design by the amount of WTP for
the same OMOE.
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WTP for Utility Lower than Base Case
Figure 5-11
Now that a monetary value can be assigned to the difference in
Utility for two design alternatives, a decision tree analysis
(DTA) will be applied in order to determine the value of holding
the option to switch between one or more of the preferred
designs as the scenarios may or may not change in a uncertain
future.
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Since HULL I was the preferred design in the Pareto analysis and
also selected as the preferred design for Scenario A, its
Utility in each scenario will be taken as the base in that
scenario. That is to say that, the WTP for choosing HULL I in
any scenario will be zero. Since the decision nodes in the
decision tree will be used to maximize WTP, and by choosing HULL
I in any scenario will yield a WTP of zero, no negative values
will be rolled back through the decision tree. The property
represents the option characteristic of truncating down-side
losses, while allowing for potentially substantial gains. That
is to say, that the worst Utility the war fighter will be
provided in any scenario is that provided by HULL I, which would
have been chosen by the conventional Pareto method, had
flexibility to switch not been incorporated. The value of the
flexibility to switch will always be positive, or it will not be
exercised.
Figure 5-12 represents the decision tree used when only single
hull designs are used. A similar tree is used for each of the
three cases: HULL I only, HULL II only, HULL III only.
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Scenario C Build Hull I
Scenario C Build Hull I Scenario A Build Hull I
Scenario B Build Hull I
Scenario C Build Hull I
Scenaio A Build Hull I Scenario A Build Hull I
Scenario B Build Hull I
Scenario C Build Hull I
cenario B Build Hull I Scenario A Build Hull I
..
Scenario B Build Hull I
Decision Tree Model for Single Hull Designs
Figure 5-12
Figure 5-13 represents the decision tree used when two designs
are available for switching. Variations of this tree are used
to account for all three possible combinations of the pairs of
designs.
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Build Hull I
B Clone 1:Scenio 2
Scenario C
<Build Hull II
B Clone 1: Scenario 2
Build Hull I
Scenario C
Scenario 2 BuildHullII
Build Hull I
Build Hull I Scenario A
1 Build HulIIII
Build Hull I
Scenario A <Scenario B
Build Hull II
Build Hull I
ii Clonel1:Scenario 2
cenario BB
Build Hull II Clone 1: Scenario 2
Decision Tree Model for Option on Two Hull Designs
Figure 5-13
Figure 5-14 shows the decision tree used when all three designs
are available to be chosen.
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Build Hull III
Clone 1: Scenario 2
Scenario C Build Hull I
-J Clone 1: Scenario 2
Build Hull II
_ Clone 1: Scenario 2
Build Hull III
u Clone 1:Scenario 2
Build Hull III
Scenario C Build Hull I
Scenario 2
Build Hull II
Build HullhIII
Scenario A Build Hull I Scenario A Build Hull I
BuildHull II
Build Hull III
I
cenaid Huid Hll
uidHulI Clone 1: Scenario 2
Build Hull III
-- 
Clone 1: Scenario 2
cenario B -E/ Build HullI Clone 1:Scenario 2
Build Hull II
Clone 1: Scenario 2
Decision Tree Model for Option on Three Hull Designs
Figure 5-14
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For all of the decision trees and cases used, the probability
that any scenario would occur in either time period was fixed at
1/3 for illustrative purposes. Calculating the value for each
decision branch used the WTP calculation described above and
summed the value for the designs selected over that path in the
tree. For example, for a branch which has HULL I, Scenario A in
period 1 and HULL II, Scenario B in period 2, the WTP would be
calculated by summing the WTP between HULL II/Scenario B with
HULL I/Scenario B and HULL I/Scenario A, since the HULL I chosen
in period 1 will still be in service in period 2. This value
(in this two design example) would be compared to zero (HULL
I/Scenario A in period 1 and HULL I/Scenario B in period 2).
The greater value will be selected for this branch of the tree.
Once all branches are similarly calculated and rolled back, the
WTP of the flexibility of being able to choose among the designs
as compared to having selected only HULL I is determined. For
the DTA with no other uncertainty, the results for each case are
summarized in Table 5-8.
Table 5-8
Value of Flexibility (WTP) Compared to Hull I Only Base Case
Flexibility Incorporated WTP Compared to Hull I only
Hull I, Hull II, Hull III $85.56
Hull I, Hull III $81.73
Hull II, III $71.55
Hull III $67.46
Hull I, Hull II $61.63
Hull II $47.41
In order to account for uncertainty in the actual design
parameters determined by the synthesis program, a Monte Carlo
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simulation was run for each case, using probability
distributions to represent the calculated design parameters,
rather than single, certain values. The mean and standard
deviation of the WTP for each case are summarized on Table 5-9.
Table 5-9
Value of Flexibility (WTP) Incorporating Design Uncertainty in
Monte Carlo Simulation
Flexibility WTP Compared to Hull WTP Standard
Incorporated I only Deviation
Hull I, Hull II, $91.3 $15.9
Hull III
Hull I, Hull III $82.9 $16.0
Hull II, III $79.3 $22.3
Hull III $66.8 $30.3
Hull I, Hull II $64.3 $18.5
Hull II $43.0 $33.9
5.5 Case Results and Discussion
Based on the results presented in Tables 5-8 and 5-9, it has
been shown that a monetary metric can be determined for the
value of flexibility to switch between one or more ship design
options as mission scenarios change. Additionally, by
incorporating uncertainty in the resulting design
characteristics, the variation of the value of the flexibility
can be determined.
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Analyzing the results from this particular example, it can be
concluded that the value to the war fighter of any design
combination other than "HULL I only" would be preferred. It
should be noted that this is the opposite conclusion drawn when
using the typical Pareto analysis which does not account for the
relationship between OMOE and cost, and does not account for
flexibility. Additionally, it can be seen that although having
the option to choose between all three hull designs has the
highest WTP, the choice of only HULL I and HULL III is possibly
the best choice, depending on how much it would cost to create a
design for HULL II, which only marginally increases the WTP over
the HULL I/III case.
The WTP calculated above can be thought of as the amount that
the war fighter should be willing to spend to acquire the
additional flexibility, in order to be able to exercise the
option to switch to the additional design(s) when appropriate.
For example, if it would cost $200M to design HULL III to have
it available for a change in scenario, it would not be worth it
as the expected WTP is only on the order of $80M. If, however,
it would only cost $40 to have the additional design ready
should the situation dictate, the investment in the flexibility
would be justified.
Certainly there are many underlying assumptions that make these
results less that exact. One key assumption in the decision
tree is that all of the uncertainty is resolved prior to the
decision on which design to build is made. This is obviously
unrealistic. Additionally, this analysis assumes that the
chosen design successfully makes it through the acquisition
phase. Again, this is not a certainty, but some of this
uncertainty is accounted for in the Monte Carlo simulation which
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places a probability distribution on the expected
characteristics rather than considering them a certainty. The
selection of and transition of the probabilities for each of the
decision tree branches is also open to scrutiny. These values
will have to be a best estimate, based on intelligence sources,
as there is no good way to predict future war fighter needs,
based on historical trends.
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CHAPTER 6 Conclusions and Further Work
6.1 Conclusions
Although it requires many underlying assumptions that may be
difficult to justify in an absolute sense, the thesis has shown
that the use of Real Options thinking can be applied to a public
sector project such as Naval ship design and acquisition. A key
conclusion from this work is that a monetary value of project
flexibility can be determined. Although not with the accuracy
of options analysis applied to financial instruments, or even
private, tradable projects, the value derived by this method for
public sector projects gives an indication of the order of
magnitude of incorporating flexibility into a project to deal
with future uncertainty. This method deals with both the
endogenous (project) uncertainties, as well as exogenous
uncertainties, like changing mission needs.
6.2 Further Work
Future applications of this method could include valuing the
flexibility for modular payload designs for single ship designs,
rather than valuing the flexibility to choose between different
designs altogether. Also, the decision tree could model the
different stage of the acquisition process and incorporate
options to switch to different technologies or systems, or
abandon the project in favor or some other project. Finally, a
sensitivity analysis could be incorporated to show how decisions
would change as the branch probabilities are varied.
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A recommendation for further study in a slightly different vein
would be to incorporate a Markov method in the decision tree.
In this case, the probabilities could be varied in time, if a
sufficient transition matrix could be determined. The Markov
method would allow the ships built in each time period to be
tracked and their value in future scenarios evaluated. A key
advantage to this method, since it moves forward in time and
does not have to "roll-back" values, would be that many more
periods, with more options in each period, could be analyzed.
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